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Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and Human
Rights Obligations under the Geneva Conventions
by Erin Chlopak*

detainees from any coverage by the Conventions, suggest the
ontroversy has surrounded the United States’ detenU.S. government has improperly interpreted its legal obligtion and treatment of nearly two hundred alleged
ations under the Conventions.
members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda at the U.S.
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At issue is the scope
The Geneva Conventions and the Scope of Their Protection
of applicability of the Geneva Conventions, a series of treaties
There are four Geneva Conventions, signed in 1949 and
that provide international humanitarian legal standards for
supplemented by two additional Protocols, signed in 1977. Constates parties during armed conflicts. In particular, the Third
vention I, For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, and Conof War and the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Provention II, For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War extend a variety
Sick and Shipwrecked Memof procedural and subbers of Armed Forces at Sea,
stantive legal rights to
enumerate protections guarprisoners of war and
anteed to members of the
other victims of armed
armed forces who fall ill or are
conflicts. As states parties
injured during an armed conto the Conventions, both
flict. Convention III, Relative
the United States and
to the Treatment of Prisoners
Afghanistan are legally
of War, and Convention IV,
bound to afford the proRelative to the Protection of
tections guaranteed in
Civilian Persons in Time of
the treaties to prisoners
War, describe protections guardetained as a result of the
anteed to persons who are
present conflict between
taken into enemy custody durthe two countries.
ing an armed conflict. Protocol
In January 2002,
I, relating to the Protection of
shortly after their detenVictims of International Armed
tion, U.S. Secretary of
Conflicts, and Protocol II, relatDefense Donald Rumsing to the Protection of Vicfeld labeled the Guantims of Non-International
tanamo Bay prisoners
Armed Conflicts, extend pro“unlawful combatants” Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees sit in a holding area under the watchful eyes of military police at Camp X-Ray at Naval Base Guantanamo
tections of the Geneva Conwho “do not have any Bay, Cuba, during in-processing to the temporary detention facility
ventions to persons combating
rights under the Geneva on January 11, 2002.
foreign occupation or interConvention[s],” indicatnally racist regimes, as well as to victims of internal conflicts.
ing that the prisoners would be treated “for the most part . . .
Most relevant to the Guantanamo Bay detainees are the
in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva
Third and Fourth Conventions. The Third Convention
Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate.” In response
defines categories of persons entitled to POW classification,
to this and similar statements, as well as footage of the
articulates the procedure for classifying a prisoner whose
detainees incarcerated in metal cages and wearing shackles,
status is unclear, and enumerates the rights of detainees
blacked-out goggles, surgical face masks, and sound-blocking
classified as POWs. Article 4 of the Third Convention defines
earmuffs, other governments and human rights groups have
several categories of persons entitled to classification as priscondemned the U.S. for failing to respect human rights
oners of war, including persons “who have fallen into the
and humanitarian law. Perhaps in acquiescence to this interpower
of the enemy” and who are (1) members of armed
national pressure, the U.S. has modified its position on the
forces of a party to the conflict; or (2) members of other miliapplication of the Geneva Conventions, announcing in early
tias or volunteer corps, which are commanded by a person
February that prisoners who fought for the Taliban in
responsible for subordinates; have a fixed and distinctive
Afghanistan would be covered by the Conventions. In spite
symbol, recognizable at a distance; carry arms openly; and
of U.S. efforts to allay international criticism, human rights
conduct operations in accordance with the laws of war. Artigroups and international legal scholars continue to charge
cle 5 explains that “[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether
that this latest decision fails to conform fully to the duties of
persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
the U.S. under the Geneva Conventions. Specifically, while
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the catthe U.S. accurately acknowledged the general applicability
egories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
of the Conventions to Taliban detainees, the government’s
protection of the present Convention until such time as
unilateral decision to deny all detainees prisoner of war
(POW) status, and its decision categorically to except al-Qaeda
Credit: AP Photo/Shane T. McCoy, U.S. Navy
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their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”
The U.S. government is therefore obliged to recognize the
POW status of detainees who clearly fit into an Article 4 category, and must allow a competent tribunal to determine the
status of those whose status is ambiguous.

tradicts customary interpretations of the broad scope of the
Conventions. Similarly, the executive decision categorically
to deny all detainees POW status directly violates Article 5 of
the Third Convention, which provides for the determination
of such status by competent tribunals.

Refusal of the U.S. Government to Apply the Geneva Conventions
to al-Qaeda Detainees
Defining the Status of the Detainees
In early February, White House Press Secretary Ari FleisThe U.S. government’s classification of the Guantanamo
cher commented that al-Qaeda fighters “do not qualify [for
Bay detainees as “unlawful combatants” has generated conprotection under the Geneva Conventions] because they
fusion and controversy. Secretary Rumsfeld’s early statedo not represent any country that is party to the treaty.” Artiment that all of the detainees were “unlawful combatants”
cle 4 of the Fourth Convention does not except combatants
who lacked any rights under the Geneva Conventions seemed
on the basis of their representation of a state not party to the
to imply that “unlawful combatants” inherently are not proConventions, but rather it excludes persons who are nationtected by the Geneva Conventions. “Unlawful combatants,”
als of a state not bound by the Conventions. Thus, the lanoften referred to as “unprivileged combatants” are those
guage of the Conventions seems to indicate that persons who
fighters who are not entitled to the privileges of POW status.
fought on behalf of al-Qaeda, and who are nationals of a state
Unlawful combatants, however, are not persons lacking all
party to the Conventions, would be within the scope of their
rights under the Conventions. Indeed, rather than suggest
protections.
that certain categories of aggressors may be excepted from
According to HRW, the detainees encompass a variety of
the protection of the Conventions, Article 4 of the Fourth
nationalities, including Afghans, Pakistanis, and, in lesser
Convention professes a broad protection of persons “who,
numbers, Saudis, Yemenis, Uzbeks, Chechens from Russia, Chiat a given moment and in any mannese, and others. Each of these
ner whatsoever, find themselves,
nations has both signed and ratified
Secretary Rumsfeld’s early statement that
in case of a conflict or occupation,
the Conventions, or joined the Conall of the detainees were “unlawful
in the hands of a Party to the conventions by accession. The United
flict or Occupying Power of which
States ratified the Conventions in
combatants” who lacked any rights under
they are not nationals.” The only
1955. Although China, Pakistan,
the Geneva Conventions seemed to imply
caveat to this encompassing prothe Russian Federation, Yemen,
that “unlawful combatants” inherently are
tection is that the prisoners must
and the U.S. entered reservations
be nationals of a state bound by the
and/or declarations upon signing
not protected by the Geneva Conventions.
Convention.
the Conventions, none of the reserThe International Committee
vations or declarations provides a
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Criminal Tribasis for excluding their nationals from the general protections
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have interpreted the
afforded by the Conventions, or from the benefits of POW staThird and Fourth Conventions jointly to embrace all persons
tus in particular. In addition, these reservations and declarawho fall into enemy custody during an armed conflict, and
tions do not provide a basis for denying such protections. Thus,
neither has recognized an exception for so-called unlawful
the U.S. government’s current policy of categorically refusing
combatants. Quoting both sources, Human Rights Watch
to apply the Geneva Conventions to non-Taliban detainees con(HRW) explained that “‘nobody in enemy hands can fall outtradicts customary legal interpretations of the scope of the Conside the law,’” and prisoners detained by an enemy in an
ventions, as well as the explicit language of the Fourth Conarmed conflict either are protected by the Third Convention
vention. Members of either the Taliban or al-Qaeda, who are
as prisoners of war, or by the Fourth Convention as civilians.
nationals of a country that has signed the Geneva Conventions,
expressly are within the scope of the treaties. Current U.S. polThe United States’ Application of the Geneva Conventions
icy at best misinterprets, and at worst ignores, this legal realAfter initially refusing to guarantee full application of the
ity and potentially renders the U.S. in breach of its treaty
Geneva Conventions to any of the detainees, the U.S. has
obligations for any actions against detainees which contradict
recently compromised, and conceded that the Conventions
the Conventions’ guarantees.
apply to Taliban detainees. Nevertheless, the U.S. continues
Denying All Detainees Prisoner of War Status
to deny the application of the Geneva Conventions to alAlthough the U.S. has correctly recognized that the Geneva
Qaeda prisoners, has refused to grant any of the detainees
Conventions
apply to Taliban fighters captured during the prePOW status, and has denied the prisoners the right to a
sent
conflict
in
Afghanistan, its unilateral decision to deny such
determination of such status by a competent tribunal. The
detainees POW status violates the procedures established by
U.S. government’s basis for distinguishing between Taliban
the Conventions for determining the status of prisoners
and al-Qaeda detainees was its recognition of Afghanistan’s
captured by an enemy in an armed conflict. Moreover, the
status as a signatory to the Conventions in contrast to al-Qaeda,
refusal of the U.S. even to recognize the Geneva Convenwhich, as a non-state actor, has not and could not have
tions with respect to al-Qaeda detainees precludes a proper
signed the treaties. Such a categorical exception of al-Qaeda
determination
of their legal status.
detainees results from a flawed interpretation of the express
language of Article 4 of the Fourth Convention, and concontinued on next page
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presently claims, none of the detainees ultimately would be
entitled to POW status, Article 5 requires that each detainee
Article 4 of the Third Convention confers POW status on
whose status is in doubt be treated as a POW until a compersons who fall into enemy power and who are members of
petent tribunal makes a final determination.
armed forces of a party to the conflict. Alternatively, Article
Under U.S. military regulations, a “competent tribunal”
4 characterizes as POWs members of irregular forces, such as
pursuant to Article 5 of the Third Convention consists of
militias or volunteer corps who: (1) adhere to an established
three commissioned officers. As HRW explained, the reguchain of command; (2) wear a uniform or otherwise have some
lations require that persons whose status is to be determined
fixed and distinctive symbol, which is recognizable at a distance;
be advised of their rights; be permitted to attend all open ses(3) carry arms openly; and (4) conduct operations in accorsions, call witnesses, question witnesses called by the tridance with the laws of war.
bunal; be permitted, but not compelled, to testify or otherThe Crimes of War Project, a collaborative organization of
wise address the tribunal; and be provided with an
journalists, lawyers, and scholars formed in 1999 and headinterpreter, if necessary. The regulations provide for the
quartered at American University in Washington, D.C., seeks
tribunal’s determination of the detainee’s status in closed sesto educate the public about intersion by a majority vote and require
national humanitarian legal issues.
a preponderance of evidence to
The Project recently surveyed inter[T]orture and ill-treatment of prisoners are
support the tribunal’s finding.
national legal and humanitarian
The clear purpose of Article 5,
prohibited by customary law and
experts on their opinions about the
and the corresponding proceinternational human rights treaties.
applicability of the Geneva Condures set forth in U.S. military
Article 7 of the International Covenant on
ventions to the Guantanamo Bay
law, is to ensure that the assessdetainees. Most of the survey’s
ment of a prisoner’s status is a fair
Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the
respondents believed Taliban
and objective determination.
United States in 1992, sets forth the nondetainees, and possibly al-Qaeda
Beyond violating its explicit, legal
derogable principle that “[n]o one shall be
detainees, should be accorded POW
obligations under Article 5, the
status. Most of the experts characexecutive branch’s unilateral
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
terized the Taliban detainees as
determination
of the prisoners’
or degrading treatment or punishment.”
members of Afghanistan’s armed
collective status, absent a finding
forces, entitling them to POW status
by an objective tribunal, renders
under Article 4(1) of the Third Convention. Among such
the U.S. susceptible to charges of unfairness, corruption, and
experts, Washington College of Law Professor Robert Golddishonesty.
man criticized the Bush Administration’s classification of the
Taliban as irregular forces under Article 4(2), which requires
The Significance of Recognizing the Geneva Conventions
them to meet the four criteria enumerated under that cateThe Geneva Conventions confer a variety of protections
gory. Similarly, during a recent interview on National Public
to prisoners detained during an international conflict.
Radio, David Scheffer, Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of
Among them are protections relating to humane treatment
Peace, emphasized the importance of recognizing that cap(Convention III, Article 3; Convention IV, Article 3), intertured Taliban fighters are part of the organized, armed force
rogation (Convention III, Article 17; Convention IV, Article
of Afghanistan, and thus entitled to POW status. Nevertheless,
31), and prosecution (Convention III, Articles 87, 99-108;
even under the four criteria enumerated for irregular forces,
Convention IV, Articles 146-47). The legal status of individmost of the experts surveyed by the Crimes of War Project
ual prisoners dictates the scope of their protections under
believed that the Taliban detainees would be entitled to POW
the Conventions. Nevertheless, all persons detained in an
status. Curtis Doebbler, Professor of Human Rights Law at the
armed conflict may be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes
American University in Cairo, asserted that the Taliban do meet
against humanity, and other crimes unrelated to armed conthe four criteria mandated for irregular forces, although he,
flict. Similarly, all detainees must be treated humanely, in
like many others, was less confident about the ability of al-Qaeda
accordance with international human rights norms, and as
detainees to satisfy the criteria.
recommended by the ICRC.
Indeed, there is less support for classifying al-Qaeda fightHumane Treatment in the Context of International
ers as POWs under the Geneva Conventions. Even HRW
Human Rights Law
has suggested that “ultimately the al-Qaeda fighters would
To provide a context for the Conventions’ requirement of
likely not be accorded POW status.” However, as HRW, the
“humane
treatment,” HRW explained that torture and illCrimes of War Project, and other experts have highlighted,
treatment of prisoners are prohibited by customary law and
the principal criticism of the U.S. position is not the govinternational human rights treaties. Article 7 of the Internaernment’s improper categorization of the detainees under
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the
Article 4 of the Third Convention. Rather, critics emphasize
United States in 1992, sets forth the non-derogable principle
the government’s failure to make individualized determithat “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
nations about the status of each prisoner, and its outright
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Similarly,
neglect of Article 5, which requires that a competent tribunal
the
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
resolve such controversial determinations. Article 5 further
Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, to which the U.S.
provides that detainees whose legal status is in doubt “shall
became a party in 1994, prohibits, under all circumstances, the
enjoy the protection of the present Convention” until a tribunal makes the final determination. Thus, even if, as the U.S.
continued on next page
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Generally speaking, POWs may not be prosecuted or punished for mere participation in the armed conflict, although
use of torture and other excessive forms of punishment.
they may be tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and crimes unrelated to the conflict. Article 83 of the Third
The Ramifications of POW Status: Humane Treatment and
Convention requires that a detaining power exercise “the
Interrogation
greatest leniency” in determining whether an offense alleged
Although all of the Guantanamo Bay detainees are entito have been committed by a POW be adjudged by judicial
tled to humane treatment under the broad provisions of the
or disciplinary proceedings and provides that “wherever
Geneva Conventions and the more specific provisions of
possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures” shall
international human rights treaties, those entitled to POW stabe taken. Article 84 enunciates that “[i]n no circumstances
tus are guaranteed further protections. Regarding interrowhatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind
gation and prosecution, for example, the Third Convention
which does not offer the essential guarantees of indepenextends additional protections to POWs. Under Article 17,
dence and impartiality as generally recognized, and in parPOWs are required only to disclose their last names, first
ticular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused
names, rank, birth dates, and military serial numbers.
the rights and means of defence
Although both POWs and unpriviprovided for in Article 105.” Artileged combatants are protected by
cle 105 correspondingly guaranIn light of these and the numerous other
the Conventions’ general prohibitees POWs the assistance of a legal
tions against torture, Article 17 prorights guaranteed to prisoners of war, it is
defense by a qualified advocate
vides that POWs who refuse to
clear that the Guantanamo Bay detainees
or counsel of his choice. It furanswer interrogations “may not be
ther requires that the detaining
are
not
being
treated
in
accordance
with
threatened, insulted, or exposed to
power deliver to the protecting
the Third Convention.
unpleasant or disadvantageous
power a list of persons qualified to
treatment of any kind.” Article 21
present the POW’s defense, and
prohibits holding POWs in close
ultimately obliges the detaining
confinement except as necessary to safeguard their health, and
power to appoint a competent advocate or counsel if the
in such circumstances, the nature and duration of confinePOW does not choose his own. Article 86 guarantees POWs
ment also must be limited to what is necessary. Similarly,
the right against double jeopardy. Article 87 limits the penalArticle 25 requires that POWs be accommodated in conditions
ties to which POWs may be subjected to those that would be
as favorable as those provided for the forces of the detaining
imposed upon members of the armed forces of the detainpower stationed in the same area. Such conditions must
ing power who have committed the same acts. Article 106 proallow for the habits and customs of the prisoners, and may not
vides that every POW shall have the same rights of appeal or
be prejudicial to their health. Article 34 guarantees POWs
petition of a sentence as are guaranteed to the members of
“complete latitude” in the enjoyment and exercise of their relithe armed forces of the detaining power. Moreover, POWs
gious duties. Prisoners who are properly determined not to
must be fully informed of such rights, as well as the time limit
be POWs are not entitled to these and other guarantees enuwithin which they may appeal.
merated in the Third Convention.
In light of these and the numerous other rights guaranIn the absence of a proper determination of the status of
teed to prisoners of war, it is clear that the Guantanamo Bay
each detainee at Guantanamo Bay, and in light of the ICRC’s
detainees are not being treated in accordance with the Third
inability to disclose its findings publicly, it is difficult to anaConvention. Moreover, absent an objective determination of
lyze whether any of the detainees are entitled to these specific
their legal status by a competent tribunal, the nature of
POW privileges, let alone whether their rights have been viotheir detention violates the requirement in Article 5 that
lated. Foreign governments and media, and international
detainees whose status is uncertain be treated in accordance
human rights groups, have articulated a general concern
with the Third Convention until such status is determined.
regarding the apparent nature of the prisoners’ detention.
Their critiques have suggested that depriving the detainees of
The Consequences of Selectively Applying the Geneva
their senses of sight and hearing by requiring them to wear
Conventions
blacked-out goggles and sound-blocking earmuffs constitutes
Beyond noting the sheer illegality of selectively applying
inhumane treatment, in violation of the general human rights
the Geneva Conventions, some experts question why the
principles embodied in the Geneva Conventions.
U.S. would violate its duties in the absence of any apparent
The U.S. government has defended its detention practices
gain. Most of the experts surveyed by the Crimes of War Proas necessary security measures. On January 18, 2002, delegates
ject believe that the U.S. has little to gain from denying
of the ICRC visited the Guantanamo Bay detainees, but
POW status to qualified prisoners. Such experts noted that
ICRC standard procedures prohibit public comment on the
POWs and unprivileged combatants are equally subject to
treatment or conditions of prisoners. Rather, ICRC delegates
prosecution for fundamental human rights violations. Persubmit recommendations to detaining authorities and
haps the government’s primary concern is the apparent
encourage such authorities to take measures necessary to
conflict between its noted intention to try those detained in
resolve any humanitarian problems.
military tribunals, where procedural rights are limited and
Guantanamo Bay, continued from previous page

The Ramifications of POW Status: Prosecution and Punishment
Perhaps the most significant rights accorded to prisoners
of war are in the context of prosecution and punishment.

the rules of evidence are more indulgent, and the provisions
in the Third Convention requiring that POWs be prosecontinued on page 13
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with the gravest concern the practice of forced gynaecological examinations of women in the investigation of allegations
of sexual assault, including of women prisoners while in
custody. The Committee emphasized that such coercive
practices were degrading, discriminatory and unsafe and
constituted a violation by state authorities of the bodily
integrity, person and dignity of women.” The Committee also
expressed concern about the categorization of violence
against women as a “crime against public decency and public order,” and stated that such categorization contradicted
the spirit of CEDAW. Further, the Committee noted its deep
concern that greater penalties were imposed for the rape of
a woman who was a virgin.
Although Turkey has taken initial steps in meeting its
obligations under CEDAW by abolishing certain discriminatory laws, Turkey remains obligated to eliminate all discriminatory customs and practices, and take all measures necessary to end discrimination against women. CEDAW requires
parties not only to refrain from discriminating against
women, but also to ensure compliance by authorities and
institutions, and to take all necessary measures against any
person, organization, or enterprise that engages in discriminatory practices. The recent decree banning virginity
testing will be insufficient if sanctions are not levied against
those who violate the decree.
Conclusion
Turkey’s human rights record has been cited consistently
as grounds for denying Turkey admission into the European
Union. Repealing the virginity testing law is a step in the
right direction, but more needs to be done to eradicate the
practice. The government must initiate a nationwide campaign

Guantanamo Bay, continued from page 9

cuted and punished in a manner consistent with the treatment of members of the armed forces of the detaining country who violate similar laws.
Regardless of the government’s underlying objectives,
setting a standard for selectively applying the provisions of
an international treaty poses serious consequences to citizens
of all states parties to the agreement. In particular, some have
expressed concern over the future treatment of U.S. special
forces, who usually do not wear uniforms and therefore
could be denied POW status for failing to meet the conditions enumerated in Article (4)(2) of the Third Convention.
Conclusion
The Geneva Conventions set forth legal standards and procedures for the treatment of all nationals of states parties who
fall into enemy custody during an armed conflict. In particular, the Third Convention articulates a duty of a detaining power to convene a competent tribunal to determine the
legal status of persons detained in such a conflict. Moreover,
where the status of detainees is in doubt, a detaining power
is required to accord them the rights and privileges
enumerated in the Third Convention until such status is

to inform women that the practice has been banned and that
they have the right to refuse to comply with virginity testing.
Further, doctors must be notified regarding the new law. To
fully comply with international human rights standards, Turkey
should adhere to the following measures, as recommended by
HRW: stop detaining women for illegal prostitution without
objective evidence; prohibit police from forcing women suspected of prostitution to undergo gynecological exams without their consent; stop discriminating against women by holding them to subjective standards of modesty to which men are
not held; publicly denounce the forced imposition of virginity exams under any circumstances as a grave and intolerable
human rights abuse and a violation of domestic and international law; direct state-employed doctors not to perform virginity exams on girls and women; train law enforcement personnel, health care providers, public officials, and others
involved in the custody, interrogation, and treatment of
detainees that compulsory virginity exams are prohibited,
and will result in punishment; and examine rape victims only
with their informed consent, the authorization of a prosecutor or judge, and only for the purpose of gathering forensic
evidence.
Turkey’s actions in the near future will indicate whether
officially banning virginity testing constitutes a real commitment to eradicating this egregious practice or an empty
promise designed to improve its reputation. To meet its
obligations under international law and truly improve its
standing in the international community, Turkey must
demonstrate respect for women’s human rights not just on
paper, but in practice. 
* Chanté Lasco is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief.

determined by an objective tribunal. The circumstances of
the detention and treatment by the United States of the
prisoners currently detained at Guantanamo Bay fail to
conform to the Geneva Conventions in several respects. The
refusal to recognize the Conventions with respect to prisoners
classified as members of al-Qaeda violates the text and
customary interpretations of the Fourth Convention. The
unilateral determination that no prisoner is entitled to POW
status violates the Third Convention’s guarantee that such
determinations are to be made by competent tribunals.
Finally, in light of the likelihood that at least some of the prisoners should be entitled to POW status, the nature of their
detention violates the various provisions of the Third Convention, which guarantee privileged treatment to POWs.
As one of the most powerful nations in the world, the U.S.
is setting a dangerous precedent for the future application
and interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. In the interest of its own credibility, as well as the future safety of its own
armed forces, the U.S. government would be well advised to
reconsider its position and comply with all of its obligations
under the Conventions. 
* Erin Chlopak is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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